Laytime Clauses 装卸时间条款
2.266 In both cases referred to above, the strike was by the servants of a third party and the question therefore arises as to whether it would make a difference if the strike had been by the servants of the charterers or consignees as the case may be. It is submitted that the answer is ‘‘No’’, provided that it is shown that no alternative source of labour was available. However, in his speech in Hick v. Raymond & Reid, Lord Ashbourne does seem to suggest that a relevant factor might be whether ‘‘the happening of the strike was entirely beyond and outside the control of either’’ party.
2.267 If by this is simply meant that, in the event of a strike, alternative sources of labour must, if possible, be found, then no problem arises. However, if it was intended to suggest that the causes of a strike might be relevant, then considerable dif?culty might arise in deciding culpability or otherwise for the delay.
Actions of port and other authorities
2.268 Where the actions or omissions of port and other authorities, whether de facto or de jure, delay or impede loading or discharge, the resultant loss suffered by the shipowner will not be recoverable from the charterers.
2.269 Thus, in Ford and others v. Cotesworth and another, a vessel was discharging at Callao when news arrived of the approach of a Spanish ?eet. The local Customs authorities, apprehending a bombardment of the port, refused to allow any more goods to be discharged into the Custom House since they wished it to be cleared of goods already landed before the arrival of the Spanish ?eet. The vessel consequently lay part discharged for seven days, when she was ordered away to be out of the danger of bombardment, after which she returned and discharge was ?nally completed.
2.269因此，在 Ford and others v. Cotesworth and another案中，正在秘鲁卡亚俄港卸货时船舶，传来消息说一艘西班牙舰队正在逼近。当地海关当局害怕港口遭到炮击，拒绝允许再往海关仓库继续卸货，因为他们希望在西班牙舰队抵达之前清理所有已经卸到岸上的货物。为了避开炮击的危险，该轮被指示载着剩余未卸的货物离开，经过7天之后，她才又返回并最终将货卸完。
2.270 In these circumstances it was held at ?rst instance by the trial judge that there was no claim for the period whilst the vessel was away from Callao and by the full court that there could also be no recovery for the time whilst discharge was suspended by order of the Customs authorities.
2.271 Similarly, in Good & Co v. Isaacs, a ship was chartered to carry oranges to Hamburg, discharging at a usual fruit berth. When she arrived, the usual fruit berths were occupied and the fruit warehouses full. The warehouses and the cranes used for discharging were under the control of government of?cials, who did not give permission for the vessel to berth for ?ve days. The Court of Appeal rejected the shipowner’s claim for this delay. Kay LJ said:
I think the true result of the evidence is that there was no delay except what was occasioned by the custom of the port, and for this the charterers are not responsible.
2.271同样，在Good & Co v. Isaacs—案中，该轮出租运输柑橘到汉堡，并在通常的水果泊位卸货。当她抵达时，这些通常的水果泊位均被占着，而且，装水果的仓库也已经满了。这些仓库和卸货用的吊车均在政府官员的控制之下，他们过了 5天才批准该轮靠泊。上诉法院驳回了船东就这一延迟提起的索赔。Kay大法官说：
2.272 In Weir & Co v. Richardson, it was held that the principles set out above applied even where the dock authority, the River Wear Commissioners, were negligent in discharging the ship.
2.272 在Weir & Co v. Richardson—案中，法院还判定：上述原则甚至还适用于码头当局、河道管理委员会在卸货过程中疏忽大意的情况。